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A b s t r a c t
This paper discusses the nature of committed and determined 
costs in a new product development project, and quantifies their 
relationship to project uncertainty. We introduce the concept of 
"product, process, schedule and market (PPSM) intelligence" and 
emphasize its use for jointly considering marketing and production 
factors in project evaluation. Using a discriminant function-based 
measure of information gain, we compare committed cost, incurred 
cost and information gain over the life of a development project.
The method leads to a risk profile that may be constructed from 
the observed behavior of the firm, without the use of hypothetical 
lotteries. We show, using data from two companies, that this cost-risk 
construct is meaningful and can provide guidance for operational 
decisions in the new product development process.
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in New Product Development
F. Phillips and R. Srivastava 
January 1993
I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is often observed that the greatest portion of total product 
development costs are committed in the design phase. That is, new 
product design, engineering, production and marketing costs are 
committed, or "frozen," much faster than they are actually expended. 
More specifically, several sources (see e.g. Corbett, 1986; Rasmussen, 
1990; Port et a i ,  1990) report a pattern of committed vs. expended 
monies over the development cycle similar to that of Figure 1.
At each phase of this cycle, the firm attempts to reduce project 
uncertainty by pursuing increasingly accurate estimates of life cycle 
cost and the likelihood of success in the marketplace. This is achieved 
by means of consumer focus groups, production pilot tests, destructive 
testing, test markets, and so on.
It has been informally observed"* that a firm should not commit 
funds at a rate that exceeds the rate of uncertainty reduction. This is 
apparent from the following argument; A given return on investment 
(ROI) is projected for a project, and a certain investment has been 
committed. Given that subsequent information confirms the expected 
ROI, what incentive would justify committing additional funds? For a 
r isk-averse manager, the answer is, "only a reduction in the 
uncertainty surrounding the ROI estimate."
The purpose of this paper is to formalize this observation. The 
paper elucidates the nature of committed costs and clarifies the
“I inter alia, in remarks by Wolter Fabrycky at the National Science Foundation 
International Workshop on Concurrent Engineering Design, held at the IC2 Institute in 
October, 1990. See also Blanchard and Fabrycky (1990). The authors are grateful to Prof. 
Fabrycky for additional helpful comments during the research leading to this paper.
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associated terminology. We develop a measure of uncertainty that is 
pertinent to the Go/NoGo decision for a new product, and, using both 
published and proprie tary data, compare average rates of cost 
commitment and average rates of uncertainty reduction in project 
adm in is tra tion. As part of this descriptive effort, we lay the 
groundwork for operational guidelines for gathering market, product 
performance and process intelligence when the firm is under pressure 
to achieve rapid time-to-market.
The following sections clarify the nature of committed costs, 
develop the needed uncertainty measure, assess the risk behavior of the 
firms on which the data were based, and interpret the implications of 
the work.
C om m itted  Costs
Committed costs are fixed future streams of expenditures. 
Within this definition are leases and other contracts (with suppliers, 
custom ers and em ployees), warranties, mortgages, and capita l 
amortizations. Such commitments can reduce uncertainties of supply, 
eliminate some search costs, increase demand, deny opportunities to 
competitors, and lock in lower costs over the life of the commitment.
Designs, tooling, and other hardware are also frozen at the time a 
decision is made to commit funds. Another relevant category of costs, 
then, are those that flow consequentially from a design decision. If, 
for example, a design calls for aluminum rather than plastic, aluminum 
must be purchased and machines for forming aluminum must be 
acquired. "These detail design decisions... in large measure determine 
how big the factory will be, how many assembly operations will be 
requ ired , and what the com ponen t purchase cos ts  w ill be 
(Chryssoiouris, Graves and Ulrich, 1991)." Some of these costs, e.g. 
the incremental cost of acquiring aluminum processing equipment 
rather than plastic molding machines, are known. Others, such as the 
future relative prices of aluminum and its alternatives, are subject to 
uncertainty.
The first category, c o m m it te d  costs (including leases etc.), are 
nonrecoverable if the project fails. The second category (materials
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etc.), a lthough possibly recoverable, are irreducible if the project 
proceeds. The co llection of both categories might be called 
d e te rm in e d  costs. In the next section, we examine the foundations of 
Figure 1 and find that this distinction is meaningful. Appendix 1 traces 
the history of Figure 1 in the literature.
Freezing designs and costs makes "downstream" tasks more 
efficient, because engineers and managers know what it is that must be 
manufactured, advertised and distributed, and under what conditions 
these tasks must be executed. Contingency plans dealing with other 
design alternatives can be discarded. On the other hand, of course, 
committed costs reduce flexibility. They make less cash available for 
alternative investments that may come to light. If market estimates 
or consumer requirements change, costs sunk into the wrong design are 
not recoverable. Managers ask, "What would It cost to shut down this 
project?" The answer to this question is, "the present value of all 
nonrecoverable costs." This quantity, together with speed of response, 
are components of the firm's flexibility.
Under sequential engineering, a prototype could be built and 
tested before beginning the search for the best production method. The 
costs of prototyping included only the cost of building and testing the 
prototype. Under concurrent engineering - and pressure toward rapid 
time-to-market - the prototyping activity includes looking ahead to 
manufacturability. The cost of investigating and deciding the mode of 
production is now part of the cost of prototyping. This cost is now 
committed - and possibly expended - earlier. And, if the project is 
killed, these costs are not recovered. At any stage of the development 
process, then, bailout costs are i n c r e a s e d  under concu rren t 
engineering. These increases must be offset by extra revenues from 
early market launch of successful alternative products, if concurrent 
engineering is to add flexibility to the enterprise.
Clearly, maximum flexibility would result from holding design 
alternatives open as long as possible, and operating on a cash-and- 
carry basis, making the two curves of Figure 1 converge. But this 
strategy would eliminate the benefits of cost commitment that were 
noted above, and is certainly unrealistic in almost all cases of interest 
to industry.
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Postponing cost commitments
What is the relation of cost com m itm ent to uncerta in ty 
reduction? We shall argue that the prospect of reduced uncertainty is 
the only justification for postponing cost commitments. In other 
words, if no further uncertainty reduction is expected, all project 
costs may be committed at the earliest possible moment.
At many stages in the new product development process, data are 
co llec ted  and estim ates made regarding product perform ance, 
m anufacturing process costs and a lternatives, project schedule, 
alternative investments, and market response. We refer to these 
co llec tive ly  as product, process, schedule, and market (PPSM) 
inte lligence. These intelligence gathering activ ities ("tests") are 
scheduled, and precede decision points (also scheduled). At each 
decision point, we assume, management may specify a value for
"fraction of remaining project costs to be committed at this point."2 
Four additional choices are made at each decision point: (i) "Go," i.e. 
proceed directly to rollout of the product with no further testing; (ii) 
"On" to the next test; (iii) "Skip" the next test and proceed directly to
the next test but one^; or (iv) "No Go," i.e., kill the project. (See 
Charnes, Cooper, DeVoe and Learner 1966, 1968.) The first, second and 
third a lternatives imply continuing with all scheduled production, 
advertising, and other "non-test" activities. Of course, for the fourth 
alternative, no further costs should be committed. For purposes of 
analysis, we assume no unscheduled tests or decisions are made.
These conditions, p lausib ly reflecting management practice, 
jus tify  the assertion that all remaining project costs may be 
committed immediately if no further PPSM intelligence is anticipated. 
Moreover, if the aforementioned benefits of cost commitment are 
material, all remaining costs shouid  be committed immediately under
o
Committed costs as defined above are a different quantity from the expenditures 
management authorizes at each decision juncture. In the event of a subsequent project 
shutdown, some authorized monies that have not been committed or expended may be 
recoverable.g
For example in Urban and Katz (1983) "...some conditions are identified under which a 
test may be bypassed."
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such circumstances. The following example, though unrealistic, will 
make the point: Suppose no further intelligence is to be gathered. The 
project schedule does not call for a factory to be leased until the 
product prototype is complete, and that activity is just beginning. Why 
should a lease be signed now rather than at the later, scheduled time? 
If a lease decision is to be made after a search for the best location 
and lease terms, then the search and decision should be in the project 
schedule, and the lease signed at the scheduled time. (We hold open the 
possibility that available lease terms may be so prohibitive as to merit 
a "NoGo" decision at that time.) If such a search-and-decision is n o t  
scheduled, then the lease m ay  be signed immediately; there is not, nor 
will there be, any information to indicate the contrary. There is no 
incremental cost attached to making this commitment now rather than 
later; the cost of capital pertains only to the time of expenditure, not 
the time of commitment.
Figure 2 summarizes the possible tra jectories of committed 
costs from a decision point "i." In the case of the "On" decision, an 
additional decision on committed costs must be made at stage i+1. 
Other decision options determine the path of committed costs for 
longer time spans.
Having established that all costs may be committed at the 
moment when no further PPSM intelligence is expected, we move to the 
question, "How much cost may be committed when such intelligence is 
a n t ic ip a te d ? 1
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Figure 2. Impact of GO - ON - SKIP - NO GO decision on
committed costs
100% ▲
C om m itted  
Cost
0%
Test i Test i+1 Test i+2
Time
U ncertain ty  in the new product developm ent process
Rigorous and unambiguous measures of information and uncer­
tainty have been available since the 1940s for dealing with events that 
are characterized by one or more probability distributions. What may 
be at issue in the analysis of a particular problem is the definition of 
the appropriate random variables and their distribution functions.
The problem addressed in this paper is that of describing the rate 
at which a firm commits funds, relative to the rate at which it reduces 
uncertainty. The preceding section informally established that these
two rates should be somehow l i n k e d . 4
Appendix 2 examines a number of uncertainty measures and 
concludes that the discriminant function is best suited to dealing with
4 We note, again informally, that the proposition is implicit in Akaike's (1973) 
construction of a decision-theoretic loss function from Kullback's (1959) information 
measure.
6
data like those of Table 1. Table 1 shows Booz-Allen data (cited in 
Cunningham and Cunningham, 1981) on new product project attrition.
Table 1
development
stage
number of
surviving
projects
q=Prob {market 
success | survived 
this stage}
-q In q
- ( 1 - q ) l n ( 1 - q )
start 1 1 6
product evaluation 2 4
economic analysis 1 4
product development 6
test market 2
0.009 0.050
0.042 0.173
0.071 0.257
0.167 0.451
0.500 0.693
According to Morrison (1976), the log likelihood ratio 
X = In [ g(.) / h(.) ] (1)
is a sufficient function for discriminating between two distributions g 
and h, based on an observation vector x of what we have called PPSM 
test results. In the Kuliback (1959) theory, X is equal to the 
information provided by x favoring the hypothesis H-j: x ~ g(x) over the
hypothesis H2 : x ~  h(x). That is, the discriminant function (4) is the
optimal way of classifying a project either as a member of the 
population "products that will succeed" or as a m ember of the 
population "products that will fail." The decision rule is, "x was 
generated by a member of the successful population g if X > 1, and by a 
member of the unsuccessful population h if X &  1."
A sequence of PPSM intelligence gathering activities i = 1,2, ..., n 
occur throughout the duration of the development project, resulting in 
the data vector x = (xj). Each x, is a random variable with density
gj(Xj), We build a stepwise discriminant function using the cumulative 
PPSM data:
7
*1 = (X1)'
%2 = ^2 (x 1 »x2)*
Xp = ^n(x 1 >x2> •••>xn)*
(2 )
If the PPSM results x, are not collinear, each successive X\ will
be a better discriminator in that the probabilities of misclassification 
will be reduced.
The PPSM test y ie lds d iscrim ina tion  in form ation X\.
Following this test, if the project is not terminated, a decision must be 
made concerning the amount of further cost commitment. We desire to 
commit costs at a rate less than or equal to the rate of change of 
information increase (uncertainty decrease). The value of X\+ -\ is not 
yet known, so we must estimate it using its expected value under H-|
?i+1 = l g j + i ( x i + i )  X - j + i ( x i , x 2 ........ x i + i )  d x i+1 . (3 )
The additive property of the logarithmic information measure 
(see Kullback, 1959) allows us to propose the operational rule
A t phase i (following test #!)> commit the additional fraction of total 
project costs equal to (?j+ / - Xj)/(IAfl - I j ) .
However, as we are in th is in itia l deve lopm ent primarily  
concerned with descriptive rather than normative measures, we now 
return to the attrition probabilities of Table 1, reinterpreting them in 
Table 2 as the (average) odds of correctly classifying a successful 
p r o d u c t6 . The rightmost column of Table 2 may be identified with 
equation (3). It is the expected value of the discriminant function at 
each stage.
The rightmost column of Table 2 is graphed in Figure 3. It is, as 
des ired , m onoton ica ily  increasing, im ply ing that uncerta in ty  is 
m onoton ica lly  decreasing. If the rate of cost commitment and
5 Perfect information is obtained when xn, the actual market performance, is observed. At
that time, X will have an infinite value. However at that time all project costs will have 
been committed, so the relevant span of time for this analysis of cost and uncertainty ends at 
the moment of the product rollout decision.
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uncerta inty reduction were parallel, however, and if Figure 1 is 
accurate, the graph of Figure 3 would have the concave shape of the 
upper curve in Figure 1. In the next section, we attempt to reconcile 
Figure 1 and Figure 3.
Table 2: Average log odds of correctly identifying a 
successful product. (From the data of Table 1.)
q=Prob {market
development success j survived odds of success log odds
stage this stage} = q/(1-q) success
start 0.009 0.009 -4 .745
product evaluation 0.042 0.043 -3 .135
economic analysis 0.071 0.077 -2 .565
product development 0.167 0.200 -1 .609
test market 0.500 1.000 0.000
Figure 3. Average log odds of correctly identifying a 
successful product, by development stage.
product economic product 
start evaluation analysis development test market
0.000 -I--------------------- 1--------------------- 1--------------------- 1-
Product developm ent risk: Em pirical resu lts
Company A
The Shields data on committed costs (see Figure 1 and Appendix 
1) probably heavily represent avionics and aircraft parts manufactured 
by aerospace firms. The Booz-Allen data of Table 1 cover a variety of 
industries, but list toward consumer goods. Inferences drawn by 
comparing the costs of the former with the risks of the latter would be 
suspect. Instead, in this section we present and compare results drawn 
from two individual firms, one on the basis of secondary data and one 
on the basis of primary (original) data.
McGrath, Anthony and Shapiro (1992, page 49) offer the needed 
cost and risk data drawn from a single firm ("Company A ”) and from 
’’other companies considered to be the best" product developers in 
Company A's industry. (The consulting firm with which these authors 
are a f f i l ia te d  works la rge ly  w ith firms in e lec tro n ics -re la te d  
industries.) McGrath et af. refer to the committed costs associated 
with cancelled projects as "lost investment." The attrition and cost 
data for Company A appear in Table 3.
Table 3. Attrition and Committed Cost Data 
for Company A's failed new product development projects.
% of cancelled Lost investment
projects failing due to cancelled
development stage in this stage projects*
concept evaluation 19% 3%
planning & specification 26% 9%
development 37% 55%
test and evaluation 14% 24%
product release 5% 9%
* expressed as percent of all lost investment on cancelled projects
Figure 4a d isp lays the cum ulative  in form ation gain and 
cumulative committed costs for this firm, normalized to the same 
scale. The names used on the x-axis for the development stages are 
those used by the consulting firm. Note that Figure 4a differs from 
Figure 1 in that the lower line is information gain, n o t  cash 
expenditures.
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Figure 4a. Average uncertainty reduction vs. average 
cumulative committed cost, by development stage: 
From published data on a single firm.
concept planning & development test and prodt
evaluation specification evaluation reiea
(norrnnh'*edj cimrjlntive informaticn -------- D-------- cimulBtlvt oarrm ittcdcasts
This firm's committed cost (the upper curve) shows the same
concave shape as the Shields data. The fact that this curve lies
consistently above the risk-reduction curve shows that the firm is, 
intentionally or not, risk-inclined.
Figure 4a's comparison of rates of cost commitment and 
uncerta in ty reduction lends itself to a very simple index of risk 
behavior. To construct the index, simply sum the differences between 
the latter two rates at each development stage, then divide by the 
number of free points of comparison. For the company represented by 
the McGrath et a!, data, the risk index is (.024+.462+.357)/3=.281. The 
completely risk-neutral firm would of course have an index of zero, and 
risk-averse firms would have a negative index.
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Figure 4b displays the same analysis for the McGrath et al. data 
on the industry leaders. McGrath et al. do not reveal how many 
companies are summarized in this aggregate. The closer convergence 
of the two curves in Figure 4b, and the risk index value of -0.049, show 
that the industry leaders in Company A's industry were slightly risk- 
averse but generally matched risk reduction and cost commitment more 
skillfully than did Company A. This analysis supports McGrath et al.1 s 
contention that the leaders in Company A's industry are superior 
managers of the product development process, at least relative to 
Company A itself.
Figure 4b. Average uncertainty reduction vs. average 
cumulative committed cost, by development stage: 
From published data on an aggregate of industry leaders.
concept evaluation planning & development test and evaluation product rel<
specification
{normalized} cumulative inform alien D  aj-nulzrtivc-oanrnittedcaata
McGrath et al. note that the development stage is usually where 
most of the development investment is made. This is the stage where 
their industry leaders are most risk-averse. (The leaders become risk- 
inclined in the test and evaluation stage.) It is also where Company A 
itself is most inclined to take risk. They note further that "the best
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practice companies [shown in Figure 5] developed 48 products at a cost 
of $60 million, while it cost the case-example company $75 million - 
25% more [to develop the same number of products]." McGrath et al. 
fault Company A for scuttling an insufficient number of unworthy 
projects in their early stages. With equal justice, one might fault 
Company A for having too many bad product ideas in the first place, or 
for committing too much investment too early. The new product 
development battle can be fought on any of these arenas, and the risk 
profile developed in this paper does not unduly emphasize any of the 
arenas.
Company B
From a large, diversified manufacturer of industrial and office 
products, we obtained data on twenty new product development 
projects randomly chosen from a file representing all the f irm ’s 
business units. For project planning and evaluation purposes, this firm 
(Company B) d iv ides such projects into four stages: Concept, 
Development, Manufacturing Scaie-up, and Field Test. In each stage, a 
project manager must estimate the updated internal rate of return, 
market risk, and technology risk. This firm uses only owned factories, 
and prefers line extensions to new businesses; by avoiding leases and 
u n fa m il ia r  new equ ipm en t, co m m itted  cos ts  are m in im ized . 
Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the two curves of Figure 5 match so 
closely. indeed in the manufacturing scale-up phase, the curve 
representing rate of cost com m ittm ent fa lls below the rate of 
information increase.
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Figure 5. Average uncertainty reduction vs. average 
cumulative committed cost, by development stage: 
Data from an innovative diversified company.
(rrarniniizfrdj cum jlotive irrfarmub'txi -------- □ -------- a jrnu ln tiv r oam -nitled oagLs
The raw data show that a few of the failed projects incurred 
expenditures in excess of the forecasted life cycle cost. Indeed, the 
overrun may have contributed to the NoGo decision. The upper curve of 
Figure 5 was derived using only the failed projects, for which the 
shutdown costs were known with certainty. The shutdown decision 
may have been based on cost overruns or on the perception of relatively 
low shutdown costs, so the extent and direction of bias in the 
placement of the upper curve is a matter for conjecture. (These 
comments apply also to Figures 4a and 4b.) Also, the location of the 
left end of the line at zero is arbitrary, as the data contained no 
projects that failed at the "start" stage. However, the fact that the 
lines nearly coincide does not depend on this arbitrary choice. The 50% 
rate of conversion of concepts into market successes, and the close 
convergence of the two curves in Figure 5, demonstrate that Company 
B’s reputation as a superior developer of new products is well- 
deserved.
For Company B, the risk index takes a value of (.10+.05- 
.09)/3=.02. This index, a lthough a useful summary, obscures 
interesting diagnostic features like the crossover in Figure 5. There,
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the firm in question becomes more risk-averse in the scale-up stage 
than it was in earlier stages.
Are the development stages named by the different sources truly 
comparable, and is terminology consistent? What were the time 
periods spanned by the studies? As "committed costs" and "determined 
costs" are not conventional cost categories in corporate reporting, how 
were these quantities defined and how were they culled from financial 
records? These uncertainties suggest a preliminary investigation of 
the robustness of the discriminant function-based risk profile is in 
o rd e r .
Sens i t i v i t y  anal ysis
A 1990 SAMI report (Wall Street Journal, 1990) revealed that of 
6,960 new brands introduced in the two previous years, only 240 
reached the $1 million annual sales mark. This is slightly less than 
3,5%, quite a different number from the 50% post-introduction "success 
rate" actually achieved by Company B. The low 3.5% figure may be 
peculiar to the consumer package goods industry. But how sensitive are 
the results of analyses like those of Figures 4 and 5 to the post-launch 
success rate? Table 4 suggests they are quite insensitive. Table 4 
gives the data for the "information curve" of Table 1 for each of several 
product success rates. (The numbers for "start" and "test market" 
remain the same, of course, due to the normalization.)
Table 4. Normalized information at each development stage 
as a function of product success rate
post-launch 
success rate
start product economic product
evaluation analysis development
test
market
3% 
10% 
1 7% 
50% 
9 0%
,65
.65
.65
.65
.65
.79
.78
.78
.77
.74
.83
.83
.83
.81
.77
.90
.90
.90
.88
.83
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C onclusions, q u a lifica tio n s , and d irectio ns  for research
Joint consideration of the three curves "committed cost," 
"incurred cost" and "information gain" can illuminate the relationship 
between flexibility and risk. The relationships drawn in this paper can 
elucidate the risk behavior of firms and industries, aid the comparison 
of new product development procedures between nations, and provide 
operational (normative) guidelines on how managers should commit 
project costs.
The above mathematical formulation addresses committed costs, 
and does not deal explicitly with the wider category of determined 
costs, Costs are "determined" in this wider sense when design 
decisions lock in materials and product/process technologies. The 
issue associated with "determined costs" is that changing materials 
costs, customer tastes, competitor capabilities, and product/process 
technologies may reduce the market viability of the current design. By 
including technological scanning within the scope of PPSM intelligence, 
and by including technology assessment in the ROI estimate for the 
current design, the mathematical model offered by this paper can 
address technological risk without modification.
The overt problem in new product development is to increase the 
"hit rate," i.e. the proportion of concepts that become market 
successes. A collateral problem, no less important, is reducing the 
cost of failures. It is the latter problem to which the present research 
is most applicable. This paper has discussed the nature of committed 
and determined costs, and quantified their relationship to the reduction 
of project uncertainty. We have introduced the concept of "product, 
process, schedule and market (PPSM) intelligence" and emphasized its 
use for jointly considering marketing and production factors in project 
evaluation, We have shown that the ideas developed can show the 
relationship between cost commitment and risk behavior of the firm, 
and provide guidance for operational decisions within a firm. We close 
with a call for careful collection of industry-specific data for further 
tests of these ideas.
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It is the rare conference or publication on new product 
development in which a variant of Figure 1 (in the text of this paper) is 
not displayed. In this appendix, we trace the genealogy of the several 
versions of this graph that have been circulated throughout the 
research community.
In each portion of Table A1.1, the data series (columns) are given 
the names used by the original source. All numbers are cumulative.
APPENDIX 1: Committed costs vs. expended costs
Table A1.1. Patterns of Committed/Determined Costs
Rasmussen (Kodak) 
stage 
concept 
validation 
development 
production 
operation
II. Shields
stage
conception
design
testing
process planning 
production
"committed1
65%
85
95
100
’’committed”
65%
85
92
97
100
"spent”
5%
8 
20  
80 
1 00
"cash flow" 
8%
1 3 
1 5 
25 
1 00
III. Riddell
stage
concept development 
advanced development 
full-scale development 
production 
operations & support
IV. CAM-I (MECM)
stage
concept
full development 
production 
operations & support
"determined.:
70%
85 
95 
1 00
"impactJHL-CQSl^
70%
85
95
100
■'lin.c.uriftdi:
1%
7 
1 8 
50 
1 00
.".CASE
3%
1 5 
50 
100
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V. CAM-1 (ME) 
staoe "committed
system planning and conceptual design 
preliminary system design 
detail design and development 
production, construction and evaluation 
system/product use and logistics support
55% 
85 
97 
1 00
Jakeila (1989) cites Rasmussen's 1989 presentation to CAM-I as 
the source of his figures, and Rasmussen in turn (1990) cites the Kodak 
Corporation. Shields (1989) does not cite a source. Port, Schiller and 
King (1990) cite CAM-I as the source of the graphic in their B u s in e s s  
W e e k  article; the figures therein seem to be an amalgam of those 
presented by Riddell (1989) and Lewis (1989) at various CAM-I 
symposia. Riddell's original slide cites the Boeing Corporation as the 
source of data. Lewis's slides cite the January, 1987 issue of 
M echan ica l Engineering  (denoted in Table 1 above as "ME") and the 
August, 1980 issue of M ilita ry  E lectron ics/Counterm easures  ("MECM" 
in Table 1 above) respectively.
In addition, Whitney (1989) notes that 70% of General Motors' 
cost of manufacturing truck transmissions is determined in the design 
stage. Whitney also cites a study at Rolls Royce (Corbett, 1986) 
showing that 80% of the final production cost of various components is 
determined in design.
Whitney, and Riddell and MECM, use the terms "determined cost" 
and "impact on cost," respectively. That their numbers are slightly 
higher than the corresponding numbers in the "committed cost" columns 
lends support to the distinction between "committed" and "determined" 
that we advanced in the text of this paper. Of course, there is no 
assurance that the product development stages named by these several 
sources are strictly or even approximately comparable.
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Below, we discuss a number of random processes and uncertainty 
measures in the context of the new product development process, in 
order to clarify issues and terminology, and to lead to a measure that 
will be useful in guiding expenditure decisions.
Entropy Measure
"Committed cost" as portrayed in Figure 1 of the text means 
money that must be expended at the scheduled (future) time even if the 
project is cancelled today. In the language of project management or 
decision analysis, the level of committed cost at time t or phase n is 
the "cancellation penalty” or "bailout cost" at time t or phase n.
Most firms and industries maintain project histories from .which 
the probability of bailout at phase n can be computed, namely, as the 
proportion of projects that survive the phase n review. Table 1 in the 
text of this paper displays an attrition pattern for a set of 116 ideas 
for new products. It may be read, e.g., "After economic analysis, 14 of 
the original 116 projects will have survived." In the third column, the 
quantity q represents the updated probability of success for the 
product. 1-q then is the updated probability of failure. The rightmost 
column of the table gives the entropy of the probability law (q, 1-q), as 
defined in equation (A2.1).
H(q) = -q In q -(1~q)ln(1-q) (A2.1)
The entropy is often taken as a measure of the uncertainty 
inherent in such a probability law (see Shannon, 1948). A thought 
experiment will illustrate this use of H(q). Suppose a completely 
prescient and truthful being tells us, at the prototyping phase, whether 
each given product will succeed or fail in the marketplace. The average 
information content of this message is H(q) = .117 . This small number 
means the message (which will almost always be, "The product will 
fa il") is usually unsurpris ing and hence re latively uninform ative. 
Contrast this to the higher information content of a perfect forecast 
delivered at the time of product rollout, when prior success and failure 
probabilities are more equal.
Although we might intuitively regard the development process as 
decreasing uncertainty at each stage, Table 1 shows that, on the
APPENDIX 2: Developing a PPSM uncertainty measure
21
contrary, uncertainty increases. Prior experience tells us 114 of every 
116 product concepts will fail or will be rejected prior to launch. 
Therefore for an arbitrary concept, we are almost certain that "this 
won ’t work." As we work to increase the odds of success for the 
particular concept, uncertainty necessarily increases.
The above is a consequence of the fact that the graph of p In p 
is concave over the range 0 < p < 1, reaching a maximum when p=0.5. We 
must look fu rther for an in form ation function that increases 
monotonicaliy as the odds of product success progress from very small 
to very high.
ROI Variance Measure
PPSM intelligence will be gathered at each phase shown in Table
1, making the product development process a multistage decision 
problem under uncertainty with recourse. That is, the Go/NoGo decision 
is made repeatedly, using the latest updated PPSM data. Where the 
historical data of Table 1 refer to the aggregate of past projects, these 
updated PPSM data pertain to a particular concept/product. It is 
important to note that whereas the (q, 1-q) law describes the binomial 
random  va r iab le  "su cce ss /fa i lu re ,"  the p ro je c t-s p e c if ic  PPSM 
inte lligence refers to a d ifferent random variable, a measure of 
success that for the purposes of this paper we will assume is return on 
investment (ROI).6
® The criterion could as well be payback or other traditional measures. Although advances 
in measurement such as data envelopment analysis (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) are 
now available for the multicriterion evaluation of projects, here we stay with single­
criterion measures for simplicity of exposition and to clarify the relationship between cost 
commitment and uncertainty reduction.
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a Probability
Figure A2.1: Market or ROI Forecast
The Go/NoGo decision is made according to whether the ROI 
forecast exceeds a target value, possibly with a confidence margin. 
Each forecast may be stated as a point estimate with a variance, so 
that the Go/NoGo decision can be conceptualized as in Figure A2.1, 
under a suitable assumption on the distribution of the ROI estimate. 
The probability  of project survival, immediate ly prior to a test 
producing data like that of Figure A2.1, is the expected area of the 
shaded portion. Following the test, the quantile of the Figure A2.1 
distribution representing the shaded portion is taken as the updated 
probability of marketplace success.
Each successive item of PPSM intelligence should reduce the 
variance of the expected ROI distribution. If this distribution is normal 
(Gaussian), its entropy is uniquely determined by its variance (Hastings 
and Peacock, 1975):
H(ROI) = - In V(2a2;te) (A2.2)
As a 2 decreases, H decreases, ind icating a reduction in 
uncertainty. However, this uncertainty is uncertainty about ROI, not 
about the product success/failure question per se. Measure (A2.2) 
therefore is not suitable as a guide for scheduling the commitment of 
costs. To continue the thought experiment, suppose the ROI variance 
collapses to zero around a mean that is less than the target ROI. 
Uncertainty has been reduced maximally, yet it is clear no further 
funds should be committed.
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Using the q from Table 1 as a prior distribution, and p as the 
updated probability of product success, the reduction in uncertainty 
provided by PPSM intelligence at phase n may be written as
I(p:q) = P ln(p/q) + (1-p) In [(1-p)/(1-q)] (A2.3)
where p and q refer to phase n. This measure, due to Kullback (1959), 
is a generalization of the entropy measure (A2.1).
Expression (A2.3) may represent information gain from an updated 
sample relative to a baseline sample. Akaike's principle, however, 
holds that the loss function should equal the directed divergence of the 
sample against the true distribution. For a single development project, 
there is no "true" distribution; or, we might say, the distribution 
collapses to Prob{success)=0 or Prob{success}=1 when the decision or 
market response is known. This state of affairs violates the "absolute 
con t inu ity ” assumption of the directed d ivergence measure (see 
Kullback, 1959). More plainly, for a discrete distribution, this means 
there will be zeros in the denominator.
Measure (A2.3) highlights the fact that uncertainty is not reduced 
in an absolute way; it is reduced relative to some pr io r state o f 
kn ow ledge .  Without bringing in additional considerations, we have no 
guidance as to how to specify the prior state of knowledge. For 
example, to measure reduction in total project uncertainty, must we 
use as baseline only the 1 - in -100 odds given at the top of Table 1 of 
the text, or is there a way to use all the information given in Table 1 as 
the baseline state of knowledge? In any case, information to the effect 
that "the odds of product success are n o t  1 -in-100" does not relate 
directly to what the odds of success are. Thus, measure (A2.3) alone 
cannot be used to guide cost commitment.
Directed Divergence o f p against q
Dis crim inant Functio n s
Balachandra (1984) uses discriminant analysis in a retrospective 
study of 100 new product development projects, and translates the 
results of the analysis into qualitative guidelines ("red light, yellow 
light, and green light" signals) for the Go/NoGo decision. Zirger and 
M odique (1990) a lso use d isc r im inan t ana lys is  to f ind  the
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organ iza tiona l factors conducive to success of the deve lopm ent 
process. In this section we use the discriminant technique, with PPSM 
intelligence as independent variables, for a different purpose. This 
purpose is to arrive at an information function that will y ie ld 
quantitative guidelines for the commitment of project costs.
Let us suppose that successful products, in the past, have 
returned ROIs distributed as the density function g(.), and failed 
concepts or products have had a distribution of ROI h(.). The latter 
distribution is constructed using the best estimated ROIs of projects 
that have been terminated prior to product launch, and the actual ROI 
performance of products that have failed after launch. The specific 
functional forms of these distributions are immaterial at present.
According to Morrison (1976), the log likelihood ratio
*  -  In [ g(.) / h(.) ] (A2.4)
is a su ff ic ie n t func tion  for d iscr im ina ting  between the two 
distributions, based on an observation vector x of PPSM test results. In 
the Kullback (1959) theory, X is equal to the information provided by x 
favoring the hypothesis H - j: x ~ g(x) over the hypothesis H2 : x ~  h(x). 
That is, the discriminant function (4) is the optimal way of classifying 
a project either as a member of the population "products that will suc­
ceed" or as a member of the population "products that will fail." The 
decision rule is, "x was generated by a member of the successful popu­
lation if X > 1, and by a member of the unsuccessful population if X < 1."
The usual assumption that g and h are continuous density 
functions over the interval (-00,00) implies that, e.g., a member of the 
"successful" population may have an ROI less than the target value. 
Indeed, this situation is pictured in Zirger and Maidique’s (1990) Figure
2. In reality, projects may succeed or fail for reasons other than ROI 
performance. Thus this representation is not unreasonable, and we use 
it in the developments of the present paper.
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